Pitfalls of Transparency: Lessons Learned from the Milford Flats Fire by Hartwell, T. et al.
WM2008 Conference, February 24-28, 2008, Phoenix, AZ 
Pitfalls of Transparency:  Lessons Learned from the Milford Flats Fire 
 
W.T. Hartwell, D.S. Shafer, J. Tappen 
Desert Research Institute, Nevada System of Higher Education 
755 E. Flamingo Rd., Las Vegas, NV 89119 
 
G. McCurdy 
Desert Research Institute, Western Regional Climate Center, Nevada System of Higher Education 
 2215 Raggio Pkwy., Reno, NV 89511 
 
B. Hurley 
Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration,  
Nevada Site Office, Las Vegas, NV 
 
D. Farmer 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Health Physics Department,  
Radiation Services Laboratory, Nevada System of Higher Education  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) consists of a network of 29 
radiation and weather monitoring stations located over a 160,000-km2 area of southern 
Nevada, southwestern Utah, and southeastern California.  The program provides 
stakeholders with a hands-on role in the monitoring for airborne radioactivity that could 
result from ongoing or past activities on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). 
 
The CEMP’s mission includes provisions for the transparency of the monitoring data as 
well as public accessibility to these data.  This is accomplished through direct stakeholder 
participation, public outreach, and near real-time uploads of monitoring data to a publicly 
accessible web site located at http://cemp.dri.edu/.   
 
In early July 2007, a lightning strike ignited a wildfire just outside the city of Milford in 
southeastern Utah. This fire, named the Milford Flats Fire, grew rapidly and eventually 
became the largest wildfire in recorded history in the state, burning approximately 567 
square miles. At about the same time, the pressurized ion chamber (PIC) located at the 
CEMP station in Milford began reporting average exposure rates that ranged from four to 
seven times normal for the area.  Initially, it was believed that elevated readings could be 
a result of gamma-emitting radon progeny released by the fire and transported in smoke 
plumes. The U.S. Department of Energy issued a press release offering this as a possible 
first explanation, and the release received a great amount of attention, particularly in the 
state of Utah, where concerns were expressed that the fire could be causing re-suspension 
of radionuclides associated with fallout from past nuclear testing at the NTS.  Subsequent 
analyses of particulate air filter samples obtained from the Milford station, as well as an 
examination of the data reported by the PIC, the timing of the incident, and diagnostic 
testing on the PIC, showed that the abnormal gamma readings were a result of instrument 
malfunction. 
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This paper will review the data from the PIC and the analytical results of air filter 
samples collected at Milford, and present lessons learned from the Milford Flats Fire 
Incident on providing real-time access to monitoring data for the public. 
   
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) consists of a network of 29 
radiation and weather monitoring stations located over a 160,000-km2 area of southern 
Nevada, southwestern Utah, and southeastern California (Fig. 1).  The program provides 
stakeholders with a hands-on role in the monitoring for airborne radioactivity that could 
result from ongoing or past activities on the Nevada Test Site (NTS). 
 
The CEMP’s mission includes 
providing for transparency of the 
monitoring data as well as public 
accessibility to it.  This is 
accomplished through direct 
stakeholder participation, public 
outreach, and near real-time uploads 
of monitoring data to a publicly 
accessible web site located at 
http://cemp.dri.edu/.  The CEMP is 
administered by the Desert Research 
Institiute (DRI) of the Nevada 
System of Higher Education and 
funded by the Department of 
Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear 
Security Administration through its 
Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). 
 
Figure 1.  This map shows the locations of the twenty-nine 
monitoring stations associated with the CEMP program. 
 
A history of the CEMP and a detailed description of the evolution of its capabilities and 
support functions have been presented elsewhere [1, 2, 3].  
 
PRELIMINARY IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM 
On Thursday July 6, 2007, a lightning strike ignited a wildfire just outside the city of 
Milford in southeastern Utah. This fire, named the Milford Flats Fire, grew rapidly and 
eventually became the largest wildfire in recorded history in the state, burning 
approximately 567 square miles. A DRI faculty member who was camping in the general 
area over the following weekend took note of the rapidly growing smoke plume and 
photodocumented the event (Fig. 2).  Coincidentally, this same faculty member was 
involved in the implementation of preliminary studies to measure for the potential re-
suspension of radionuclides as a result of future wildfires that could affect contaminated 
soils areas on the Nevada Test Site.  Aware that a release of radon progeny could also 
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occur during wildfires (e.g., this 
phenomenon was also observed in 
measurements taken during the June 2000 
Cerro Grande Fire at Los Alamos, New 
Mexico) [4], the faculty member logged 
on to the CEMP web site upon returning 
to his office on July 9th, curious to see 
whether or not this effect was observable 
in readings collected from the CEMP 
station located at Milford, Utah.  To the 
surprise of him and others, the pressurized 
ion chamber (PIC) located at the CEMP 
station in Milford was, in fact, reporting 
periodic average gamma exposure rates 
that ranged from four to seven times 
normal background for the area (Fig. 3).  
Initially believing that the elevated readings could be a result of gamma-emitting radon 
progeny released by the fire and transported in smoke plumes, DRI notified DOE of the 
readings and preliminary thoughts on their cause. The DOE issued a press release on July 
12th offering this as a possible first explanation, along with a statement that the elevated 
readings, which were of short duration, were not expected to have any impact on public 
health or the environment.  
Figure 3.  A graphical display from the CEMP web site showing ten-minute average values of gamma 
radiation levels at the Milford CEMP station between June 28th and July 11th. Normal gamma background 
activity for the site is approximately 20 micro-R/hr. Note the formulas at the right side of the figure to 
convert the data to micro-R/hr.  Average elevated gamma values reported by the PIC ranged up to about 
140 micro-R/hr, albeit for very brief periods. 
 
MEDIA COVERAGE 
 
The DOE press release received a fair amount of media attention, primarily from media 
in the state of Utah, where the Milford Flats Fire had already burned over 500 square 
miles in the first few days and involved upwards of 400 firefighters.  Initial reports in 
print, internet, and television media ran the gamut from fairly simple reporting of the 
 
Figure 2.  The Milford Flat Fire photographed 
on the afternoon of July 7, 2007 near the town 
of Beaver, Utah along Interstate 15.  Later that 
same day, the fire would cause the highway to 
be closed to traffic. 
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press release to expressions of disbelief that the readings could be caused by radon 
progeny to concerns that the fire could be causing re-suspension of radionuclides 
associated with fallout from past nuclear testing at the NTS.  Concerns were expressed 
about the potential health effects for firefighters working on the scene, regardless of the 
cause of the readings. Commitments were made to journalists who contacted the 
NNSA/NSO to provide additional updates as more information was known and 
confirmed.  Reacting to the initial media reporting of the radiation readings, a few vocal 
environmental organizations in Utah publically expressed their concerns and began to 
question the data and what was being reported through the CEMP station and the 
NNSA/NSO.  From a historical perspective, many residents in southern Utah have a lack 
of trust and confidence in information reported by the federal government due to their 
experiences related to historic atmospheric nuclear testing and subsequent radioactive 
fallout.  As such, in spite of subsequent abundant evidence discussed in this paper and 
provided to the public that the anomalous gamma readings were caused by equipment 
malfunction, the data being reported by NNSA/NSO and through the CEMP internet site 
was often overshadowed by the conjecture and speculative remarks by others.  The Utah 
Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Radiation Control, was contacted for 
comment and indicated that while the results being reported were not significant to cause 
public health concerns, they did warrant further investigation to conclusively explain the 
elevated readings. 
  
DIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM 
 
Analyses of Air Particulate Filters 
Immediately after the anomalous gamma readings were identified, DRI began to pursue 
several avenues of analysis in an attempt to identify the cause of the readings.  Foremost 
among these was an analysis of air particulate filters from the Milford station.  While the 
only “real-time” data on radioactivity that the CEMP stations are equipped to provide is 
the gamma exposure rate as measured by the PIC, 27 of the 29 stations, including 
Milford, are equipped with continuously running low-volume air particulate samplers.  
Filters are normally collected once weekly from the samplers by local citizens who are 
trained and who are part of the official chain of custody for the collected samples.  The 
samples are then mailed to DRI where they are collated and delivered to Test America 
(Formerly Severn-Trent) Laboratories, Inc. in St. Louis, MO, where they are analyzed 
individually for gross alpha and beta activity, with a spectroscopic analysis of gamma 
activity performed on a quarterly composite sample.   
 
In the case of Milford, the air samples containing particulate matter associated with the 
onset of the fire and the anomalous gamma readings (week of July 2-9) had been 
collected by local station managers and were already in transit via regular mail to DRI 
when the anomalous PIC readings were noted.  As a quality control measure, in addition 
to the fixed air samplers located at the CEMP stations, DRI has three “mobile” duplicate 
samplers that are rotated throughout the CEMP network on a quarterly basis.  
Fortuitously, one of the duplicate samplers was in place at the Milford station at the time 
of the anomalous gamma readings, allowing duplicate samples to be analyzed for the 
period in question.   
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In order to expedite analysis of the samples and to address public concern about the 
potential for the elevated readings to have been caused by re-suspension of fallout from 
past nuclear testing at the NTS, the University of Nevada, Las Vegas Radiation Services 
Laboratory (UNLV-RSL) agreed to conduct a spectroscopic analysis of gamma activity 
on filters collected from the Milford station immediately upon receipt at DRI’s Las Vegas 
campus.  In addition, UNLV-RSL conducted identical analyses on a filter collected from 
Milford for the week prior to the start of the fire (week ending July 2) as well as filters 
collected for these same two weeks from the CEMP station located at Delta, Utah, 
located approximately 75 miles north and generally downwind of Milford.  Eyewitness 
accounts suggest that Delta received at least as much, if not more, smoke in town as a 
result of the Milford Flats Fire as Milford.  However, PIC readings at Delta were normal 
throughout the period in question. 
 
Upon completion, a report on the methods and full results of the analyses conducted by 
UNLV-RSL on filters from Milford and Delta, UT was published on the CEMP web site 
and made available for download at 
http://www.cemp.dri.edu/CEMPREPORT_UTAHFIRES_Final.pdf [4].  In conducting 
the spectroscopic analyses, a special interest was placed on the detection of Cesium-137 
(Cs-137) in the samples, as this is the major long-lived gamma-emitter associated with 
fallout from past nuclear testing at the NTS, and is readily detectable from its ~662 keV 
emission-line.  Neither Cs-137 nor any other manmade radionuclides were detected in 
any of the filters analyzed (Fig. 4).  Several naturally-occurring radionuclides were 
identified in the samples, with Beryllium-7 (Be-7) and Potassium-40 (K-40) representing 
the most prominent gamma-emitting components at 8 to 10 mBq/m3 and 3 to 4 mBq/m3 
respectively (Fig. 4).  Be-7 is a cosmogenically-produced radioisotope formed in the 
upper atmosphere, and K-40 is ubiquitous in atmospheric dust particles, virtually all types 
of geologic materials, and even in radiation shielding materials and cement flooring.  
Other naturally-occurring radioisotopes in the uranium and thorium decay series were 
detected, but only in variable and relatively small amounts.  In summary, not only did the 
spectroscopic analysis rule out NTS legacy fallout as the source of the anomalous gamma 
reading recorded by the PIC, they also appeared to rule out the occurrence of naturally-
occurring radioisotopes in sufficient quantities to have caused the apparent increase in 
activity levels displayed by the PIC.  Pre-fire samples were comparable to those collected 
during the fire at Milford and at Delta, both in terms of radioisotopes present and activity 
levels.  Media members tracking the issue were notified of the report’s availability 
resulting in several stories. 
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Figure 4.  Gamma spectrographic analysis conducted on the Milford air filter for the week ending July 9, 
2007. 
 
In an effort to address concerns related to potential increased alpha and beta activity as a 
result of the fire, DRI had Test America Laboratories conduct expedited gross alpha and 
beta activity analyses on the filter samples collected from Milford for the week ending 
July 9th (Table I).  The full report is available for download from the CEMP web site at 
http://cemp.dri.edu/cemp/Test_America_Gross_Alpha_Beta.pdf.  All alpha and beta 
activities for these filters fell well within the normal range of measurements from 
calendar year 2006 and the 1st quarter of 2007 for the Milford CEMP station and, in fact, 
actually fell below the mean values for those periods.  Interestingly, this is in spite of the 
fact that the particulate loading on samples collected for the week of the fire mass almost 
twice as much as pre-fire samples as a result of deposition of particulates associated with 
the smoke from the fire. 
(Arrow and cursor denote location where Cs-137 
peak [662 KeV] would occur if present.) 
UNLV Dept. of  
Health Physics 
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Table I.  Gross alpha and beta activity for filters collected from the Milford CEMP station for the 
period July 2-9, 2007, with comparison to calendar year 2006 and 2007 (1st quarter) activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of Pressurized Ion Chamber Data 
 
Concurrent with the commencement of air filter sample analyses, an in-depth 
examination of data collected by the Milford PIC was initiated.  It was during this 
analysis that it became strongly suspected that equipment malfunction was responsible 
for the anomalous gamma readings.  The first indication that the readings were probably 
not related to the fire came when it was confirmed that the Milford Flats Fire had begun 
on the afternoon of July 6th, while the anomalous gamma readings began nearly a full day 
before the fire started, on July 5th (see Fig. 3).  A correlative comparison of the gamma 
readings with concurrent precipitation and barometric pressure, as well as with lightning 
strike data supplied by the Vaisala National Lightning Detection Network, showed no 
correlation of the readings with meteorological events.  However, it is worth noting that 
the highest temperature ever recorded in Utah (118 F near St. George, UT) occurred on 
July 5th, and temperatures recorded at the Milford station that day were also very high 
(around 100 F). 
 
While a graphical output of “average” gamma exposure rates (3-second readings 
averaged over each 10-minute period) is the default for the CEMP web site, it is also 
possible to select for “maximum” and “minimum” exposure rates and produce a graphical 
display that shows the maximum or minimum individual 3-second readings for each 10-
minute period.  Because the datalogger at the CEMP station queries the PIC twenty times 
each minute, selecting for the maximum exposure rate produces a graph that shows the 
individual highest reading for each ten-minute period.   
 
Typically, the maximum and minimum readings will generally closely mimic the 
behavior of the averaged readings, occurring closely above and below this line.  
Gross Alpha (pCi/m3) 
 Maximum Mean Minimum Notes 
CY2006 0.0029 0.0012 0.0003 2006 Results for Comparison 
CY2007 
(1st qtr) 
0.0030 0.0015 0.0003 1st Qtr 2007 Results 
CEMP-
09593 
 0.0010  Main Milford Station Sample 
CEMP-
09593 
 0.0009  Duplicate Milford Sample 
CEMP-
09594 
 0.0014  Duplicate Laboratory Sample 
     
Gross Beta (pCi/m3) 
 Maximum Mean Minimum Notes 
CY2006 0.050 0.024 0.010 2006 Results for Comparison 
CY2007 
(1st qtr) 
0.056 0.030 0.014 1st Qtr 2007 Results 
CEMP-
09593 
 0.021  Main Milford Station Sample 
CEMP-
09593 
 0.022  Duplicate Milford Sample 
CEMP-
09594 
 0.025  Duplicate Laboratory Sample 
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However, when the maximum and minimum readings for the period July 5th through July 
7th are plotted together on the same graph (Fig. 5), one can observe that there is an 
extremely abrupt initiation of both very high and very low (in fact, negative!) gamma 
readings.  The abnormal initiation and termination of the spikes is extremely abrupt and 
not indicative of expected behavior for passage of a plume, nor are the nearly concurrent 
high and low readings, which are much more comparable to the signature one sees when 
switching the PIC’s power on or off. 
 
Figure 5. A plot of maximum and minimum gamma exposure rate data from the Milford CEMP station for 
the period July 5-7, 2007.  Note the formulas at the right side of the figure to convert the data to micro-
R/hr.  High positive and low “negative” readings initiate concurrently late in the afternoon of July 5th. 
 
Diagnostic Testing of the PIC 
When it became clear from analysis of the above data (subsequently supported by initial 
screening of the filter samples) that equipment malfunction was likely responsible for the 
anomalous gamma readings (and unfortunately, less than a day after the press release), 
the Milford PIC was replaced (on July 14th) and sent to Pacific Northwest National Labs 
(PNNL) for diagnostic testing.  Results of the testing showed that the 70-pin SIMM 
socket on the PIC’s data acquisition board was severely warped (Fig. 6).  Possible causes 
of the warping cited by PNNL included extreme heat and/or incorrect seating of the board 
by the instrument’s manufacturer.  Incomplete connection of the pins with the SIMM 
socket may have caused a shorting of the electronics, resulting in the data signature seen 
in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 6.  A diagnostic examination of the 
PIC’s electronics by PNNL revealed a severe 
warping of the 70-pin SIMM socket of the data 
acquisition board. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS 
LEARNED 
 
There is a high degree of confidence 
that abnormal readings measured by 
the pressurized ion chamber at Milford 
in early July, 2007 were the result of 
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equipment malfunction and not the result of either an increase in naturally-occurring 
radionuclides or re-suspension of legacy fallout from the Nevada Test Site.  Analyses of 
particulate air filters from the period of the Milford Flats Fire from both Milford and 
Delta, Utah, as well as from the pre-fire period, show results consistent with previous 
measurements of normal background activity, and no detectable manmade radionuclides 
related to legacy fallout or any other manmade source.  The timing of the PIC readings 
indicates no causal link with the onset of the anomalous readings and the onset of the 
Milford Flats Fire.  In addition, the abrupt and erratic initiation and termination of high 
positive and low negative readings is inconsistent with expected PIC behavior (not to 
mention physically impossible in the case of the negative readings).  Finally, diagnostic 
testing of the Milford PIC shows severe warping of the SIMM socket on the data 
acquisition board. 
 
There were a number of valuable (and sometimes quite painful) lessons learned from the 
Milford Flats Fire incident.  As stated earlier, one of the important missions of the CEMP 
is to provide for transparency and public accessibility of the collected monitoring data.  It 
does this in part through allowing access to near real-time data on a public web site.  The 
positive side is that the public knows it is seeing the collected data just as soon as DOE 
federal employees or anyone else is---an important consideration in building public trust 
that there is no data manipulation occurring prior to public release.  The down side, and it 
can be a significant one, is that the public has access to the data before any quality 
assurance can be carried out on the data.  Although a statement regarding the provisional 
nature of the data was present within the CEMP web site previously, as a result of this 
incident the statement has been greatly expanded and now occurs on the home page and 
every page within the site on which automated data displays occur.  Despite this incident, 
the authors continue to believe, however, that the benefits of providing public access to 
near real-time monitoring data outweigh the potential adversities it can cause. 
 
“Murphy’s Law” was in constant operation from the time of the initial discovery of the 
anomalous gamma readings and for a period of about three months thereafter, especially 
related to the timing and or delays associated with disseminating (or decisions not to 
disseminate) information to the public.  The fact that the readings went unnoticed by 
project personnel for several days (the fire began on the Independence Day holiday 
weekend) followed by a subsequent delay in identifying the PIC data signatures that were 
indicative of a likely equipment malfunction can be attributed to the absence of key 
personnel at the time of the incident.  These situations have been remedied by the 
implementation of an alarm mode for the CEMP that generates emails to key project 
personnel whenever a monitoring station records an exposure rate that is more than two 
times normal background for a period greater than ten minutes.  In addition, a graphic 
“primer” on PIC data signatures is currently being developed that will aid those who are 
less familiar with the causes of various anomalies and how they display, as well as detail 
a chain of notification to follow in the event an anomaly occurs. At least once daily 
checks of all CEMP station PIC readings also have been implemented. 
 
Much thought has been given to the timing and content of the press release issued by 
NNSA/NSO.  There was some criticism leveled for being too tardy in sending out the 
release, but more for sending out a release prior to identifying the true cause of the 
readings.  The NNSA/NSO elected to err on the side of notifying the public what it 
believed to know at the time about the incident rather than delay releasing the 
information.  In hindsight, advancing additional possible causes for the readings might 
have been a more prudent approach.  However, it is interesting to note that had it been 
delayed one more day to issue the release, suspicions of equipment malfunction could 
have been strong enough that public notification may have been in the form of a footnote 
on the CEMP web site, or perhaps a very differently worded press release. 
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The NNSA/NSO and DRI representatives continued to provide updates on the filter 
analysis by UNLV and Test America Laboratories to the few reporters who continued to 
follow the issue.  However, after the results of the gamma spectroscopy confirmed that 
there was no evidence of re-suspension of legacy fallout, media interest dropped 
significantly.  A decision was made to not issue a subsequent press release on the UNLV 
analysis since those media representatives tracking the story already had the updated 
information.  The final reports on the air sampling analyses were posted on the CEMP 
web site as they became available, and DOE individually notified media who had done 
previous stories based on the initial press release that there was no evidence of legacy 
fallout based on the filter studies.  While this may have allayed most concerns about the 
origin of the gamma readings, it did not answer questions about what caused the readings 
in the first place.   
 
While confidence was high that the readings were caused by equipment malfunction, a 
decision was made not to speculatively publicize this until conclusive evidence was in 
hand.  Unfortunately, there were several delays in obtaining the conclusive laboratory 
analysis of the equipment.  During this time, one environmental organization continued to 
publish their perspectives of the elevated readings and did not give full discussion or 
consideration to the facts that were being released through the CEMP web site and 
agency representatives.  Eventually an environmental organization asked the Utah 
Radiation Control Board (URCB) for an explanation of the gamma readings.   
 
The NNSA/NSO and DRI had actually already been in contact with the URCB, and were 
invited to make a presentation at a regularly-scheduled meeting in Salt Lake City on 
October 5th (a PDF of the Powerpoint presentation is available for download from the 
CEMP web site at 
http://cemp.dri.edu/DRI_Presentation_for_Utah_Radiation_Control_Board.pdf).  During 
its communication with the URCB during and after the fire, the CEMP program had 
provided the URCB with the results of analyses prior to public dissemination, as well as 
informing them of the strong feeling that equipment malfunction was the likely cause of 
the readings.   
 
The NNSA/NSO and DRI presentations were well-received by the URCB, and served to 
answer the concerns expressed about the Milford incident by community organizations 
and the media.  An individual representing the most vocal organization admitted that they 
had been intentionally provocative with their public comments because they wanted to 
ensure that a full investigation of the matter was conducted.  Unfortunately, there was no 
attempt by the group to seek clarification from the CEMP directly, either by phone or via 
the website, or its community representatives.    
 
In the end, this experience has made the CEMP a better program.  For example, it 
provided the program an opportunity to develop a positive relationship with the URCB. 
Internal and external notification procedures of irregular equipment readings from any 
cause have been streamlined.  In addition, more comprehensive documentation of how a 
PIC can respond to natural phenomena that causes variations in external gamma readings 
(e.g., meteorological phenomena) as well as responses to equipment malfunctions was 
prepared by DRI personnel working on the CEMP that will hopefully lead to enhanced 
program capabilities and a better knowledge of how to deal with future incidents which 
are cause for public notification.  Program management were pleased that the chain-of-
custody program involving citizens who live in the communities that host the CEMP 
stations collecting the air filters and sending them to DRI worked successfully.  It was 
also appreciated that newspapers in Utah that originally carried stories about uncertainties 
about the causes of the anomalous PIC readings, also published stories when data was 
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available that showed that no man-made radionuclides contributed to the readings.  
However, although information was reported by newspapers, no subsequent comments 
and updates were published by the one vocal environmental organization expressing their 
satisfaction that the issue was sufficiently resolved.   
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
Work cited in this article was accomplished under DOE contract DE-AC52-06NA26383.  
The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the participation and contributions of 
all the stakeholders who have made the CEMP a success over the years, some of whom 
have been with the program since its inception over 26 years ago.  We would also like to 
thank all the various agency personnel at the DRI, NNSA/NSO, UNLV-RSL and EPA 
who have supported the CEMP with their time, ideas, and enthusiasm.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] W.T. Hartwell, J. Tappen, and L. Karr, “Positive Community Relations: the Keystone 
to the CEMP,” Poster presented at the WM’06 Conference, Tucson, Arizona (2006). 
[2] L.H. Karr, W.T. Hartwell, J. Tappen, and K. Giles, “The Community Environmental 
Monitoring Program: A Historical Perspective,” poster presentation for WM’07 
Conference, Tucson, Arizona (2007). 
[3] W.T. Hartwell, J. Tappen, and L. Karr, “The Community Environmental Monitoring 
Program in the 21st Century:  The Evolution of a Monitoring Network,” paper presented 
at the WM’07 Conference, Tucson, Arizona (2007). 
[4] M.P. Johansen, T.E. Hakonson, F.W. Whicker, and D.D. Breshears, “Pulsed 
Redistribution of a Contaminant Following Forest Fire:  Cesium-137 in Runoff.  Journal 
of Environmental Quality 32: 2150-2157 (2003). 
 
 
